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                                                                      Abstract 
                            A Comparison of Initial Public Offering (IPO) Underpricing  
                                        between China A-shares and B-shares Markets 
                      
                                                                           By 
                                                               Tianwei Zhang 
                                                             November 8, 2012 
 
This paper investigates the underpricing level of A-shares and B-shares IPO companies 
listed in the Chinese stock market from 1991 to 2010. The sample covers 84 IPOs of 
listed companies with 42 A-shares and 42 B-shares. Our results confirm that Chinese 
IPO underpricing is the highest among the major world markets. We further examined 
some of the factors that influence IPO underpricing such as: offering price, issuing size, 
age of the firm before going public, turnover rate in first trading day and industry type.  
The results confirm that the offering price and the turnover rate have strong influence on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Background 
China's securities market began in the early 1990’s, and has a relatively short history 
when compared with other markets in the world. At the early stage of the development 
of China’s securities market, the main objective was to raise funds to support the state-
owned enterprises. With the rapid development of China’s stock market over the past 
decade, more private and public enterprises chose this method of issuing the listed stock 
as the preferred manner of financing. Both A and B-shares are listed as issued stock in 
the Chinese stock market. In simple terms, A-shares are for domestic investors; while B-
shares are for overseas investors. Though B-shares are denominated in RMB value, 
foreign investors purchase them in foreign currency. For example, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange is required to purchase in US dollars, while the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
trades in HK dollars. 
 
 According to the latest statistics of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(published on April 5th, 2012), there are 2782 listed companies in China. There are 2674 
companies issued A-shares and 108 companies issued B-shares. Both A and B-shares 
have the total market value of 227,312.5 billion RMB, while the flow of the market 
value is 171,869.3 million RMB, and the total share capital is 2.9897 trillion shares. In 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (ending before July 2012), both A and B-shares market 
were worth 149,908.91 billion RMB, and the float market capitalization was 124,556.69 
billion RMB, of which A-shares market value was 149,218.68 billion RMB, and float 
market capitalization was 123,866.46 billion RMB, accounting for 99% of both A and B-
shares. In conclusion, A-shares trading is more popular in the Chinese Securities Market, 
and the enthusiasm of the A-shares stock trading is greater than B-shares, resulting in 
different levels of underpricing. 
 
Underpricing is a universal phenomena that exists widely in every country’s stock 
market. Loughran et al. (1994) demostrate evidence of IPO underpricing in 25 countries 
and regions, and discover underpricing levels are different between developed markets 
and developing markets; developed countries usually have a lower level of IPO 
underpricing. Moreover, there is a more serious underpricing phenomena in China when 
compared with other countries. As illustrated by Dimovski and Brooks (2004), the 
highest first-day returns were reported of 948.6% from 1987 to 1995 in Chinese A-
shares (Su and Fleisher, 1999), with the highest underpricing of an individual offering 
incredibly reaching to 38,300%. Mok and Hui (1998) find that the underpricing of A 
shares in Shanghai was 289%, which shows a significant decreasing trend in the initial-
day return for Chinese A share IPO underpricing from 1984 to the present day. 
 
1.2 Pricing Method of China’s Stock Market 
In the securities market, the IPO pricing is the core part of the stock issuance. Whether 
the new pricing is reasonable will significantly impact the issuing company’s ability to 
raise funds. Meanwhile, the stock performance in the secondary market directly affects 
the allocation of resources in the security market. The China Securities issuance audit 
system regulates that the stock is issued by the approval system. The securities’ 
authorities have the right to process the substantive review on the issuer's application 
and related materials according to the provisions of the Companies Act and Securities 
Exchange Act. 
 
Under the pricing rules in the market, supply and demand determines the stock price. 
China’s pricing system efficiently restrains the supply of some shares listed and helps to 
balances market demand and supply. Also, regulators become the implicit protectors for 
IPOs. On September 16th, 1999 and March 17th, 2000, China processed the securities 
supervision and management committee stock issuance examination committee 
regulations and the implementation of the approval procedures to accelerate the 
marketization of China's Stock Issuance System. 
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
the same listed company that issues both A and B-shares have different stock prices and 
turnover rate, which leads to different degrees of underpricing. Many new shares listed 
on the first day have a huge increase, which means on the first day of listing the initial 
trading price in the secondary market far exceeds the initial public offering price. This 
results in the market or industry average return being much higher than excess returns. 
There are many possible reasons for this: 1) it could relate to the extreme unevenness 
between supply and demand of IP. 2) The imperfect offering mechanism and the 
inadequate disclosure of information. 3) Problematic ownership structure, and over-
speculation on the secondary market. These are all inevitable problems facing an 
emerging market.  
 
Under the equity division reform and bookbuilding mechanism, the China A-share 
market is gradually emulating developed markets. Therefore it is very important to 
investigate how to solve and prevent the underpricing problem of China's Stock Market 
for the future in order to keep a healthy stock market environment. In this paper, I cover 
the period from 1991 to 2010 with the companies who have both A-shares and B-shares, 
and compare the degree of underpricing. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on underpricing, 
chapter 3 about the multi regression model with data of 1991 to 2010 to analyze 
underpricing of both A-shares and B-shares, chapter 4 contains the analysis result about 
the model, and the elements, which may affect the results. The last chapter proposes 
several suggestions for IPO in China. 
                
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 High Initial Return Phenomena of Short-term IOP  
From the 1970’s, Western scholars have noted that the market price of listed IPO’s on 
the first day or early in the secondary market is often much higher than the issue price, 
which makes market investors obtain a high initial rate of return. Therefore, the 
secondary market is much larger than the normal market rate of return. Continuous 
empirical research shows that this widespread phenomena has existed in the stock 
market for a long time. Also the problem exists in more mature securities markets, such 
as the United States; there is even a gradual rising trend on the initial rate of return in 
developed markets. Of course, the initial yields of different countries on IPO are often 
quite different. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 show the country average underpricing from 
1960 to 1990, and Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 show the country average underpricing from 
2001 to 2006. We can see from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 that the degree of underpricing 
is significantly different in different countries. The stock markets of developed countries 
have lower underpricing rates than emerging markets. In summary, the IPOs from 
developed countries are closer to the market prices.  
 
For example I show in Table 2.1, the average underpricing rates are over 30% in South 
Korea, Portugal, Thailand and Brazil from 1970 to 1990; the highest underpricing rate is 
80% from Malaysia. However, the underpricing levels of developed markets such as the 
United States, the Netherlands, France, Canada, and Finland are usually below 16% on 
average, which keeps the same trend from 2001 to 2006. Table 2.2 shows that the 
highest underpricing rate is 110.44% from China, which is developing markets as well. 
In contrast the lowest underpricing rate is 6.22% from Sweden.  
               Figure2.1: Country average underpricing 
 
                  Table 2.1: Country average underpricing 
Country Average 
underpricing % 
Period Studied Sample 
Size 
Malaysia 80 1980-1991 132 
Brazil 79 1979-1990 62 
South Korea 78 1980-1990 347 
Thailand 58 1988-1989 32 
Portugal 54 1986-1987 62 
Taiwan  45 1971-1990 168 
Sweden 39 1970-1991 213 
Switzerland 36 1983-1989 42 
Spain 35 1985-1990 71 
Mexico 33 1970-1991 472 
Japan 33 1987-1990 37 
New Zealand 29 1979-1991 149 
Italy 27 1985-1991 75 
Singapore 27 1979-1987 66 
Hong Kong 18 1980-1990 80 
Chile 16 1982-1990 19 
United States 15 1960-1992 10,626 
United Kingdom 12 1959-1990 2133 
Australia 12 1976-19889 266 
Germany 11 1987-1992 170 
Belgium 10 1984-1990 28 
Finland 10 1984-1992 85 
Netherlands 7 1982-1991 72 
Canada 5 1971-1992 258 
France 4 1983-1992 187 
Source: Financial Markets and Corporate strategy-Mark Grinblat and Sheridan Titaman, 
Tata Mcgraw Hill, 2nd edition, exhibit3.5 pg. 83 
         Figure 2.2: Country average underpricing (2001-2006) 
 
      Table 2.2: Country average underpricing (2001-2006) 




Aggregate Gross Proceeds 
(US $) 
Australia 711 19.96 15,575.33 
Austria 25 14.31 4,194.38 
Belgium 24 8.11 3,669.78 
Brazil 28 8.96 5,735.15 
Canada 21 37.03 2,462.26 
Denmark 15 23.18 1,409.35 
Finland 21 18.94 1,904.69 
France 282 12.63 21,473.64 
Germany 223 29.96 25,350.67 
Greece 49 28.02 1,370.63 
Hong Kong 521 16.10 43,379.99 
India 97 38.73 7,558.13 
Indonesia 53 38.89 1,549.59 
Italy 99 9.62 12,319.03 
Japan 1,092 57.29 51,969.59 
Malaysia 331 35.04 2,816.09 
Mexico 5 2.53 419.23 
Netherlands 12 13.49 3,691.84 
New Zealand 35 15.03 967.92 
Norway 60 4.18 7,628.94 
Philippines 23 14.08 674.42 
Poland 23 50.97 1,805.38 
Portugal 8 10.65 1,676.34 
Singapore 360 20.37 7,295.99 
South Africa 5 16.85 221.70 
South Korea 327 49.08 13,619.99 
Spain 20 7.95 6,209,96 
Sweden 42 6.22 7,882.64 
Switzerland 43 14.86 8,544.51 
Taiwan 431 17.90 6,626.98 
Thailand 153 18.35 5,016.80 
Turkey 5 19.51 746.84 
United Kingdom 1034 17.70 63,976.36 
United States 1128 24.60 23,222.79 
China 397 110.44  
Source: Earning Quality and International IPO Underpricing, Thomas J. Boultonam 
Scott B. Smartb, Chad J. Zutterc, P35 
2.2 Several Explanations of IPO High Initial Return 
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry Theory 
Previous scholars, such as Ibbotson (1975), referred to the word underpricing to 
represent the high initial rate of return phenomena on IPO. This is in fact, the expressed 
or implied acceptance of rational and efficient market assumption in mainstream 
financial theory, which means IPO pricing is efficient in the secondary market and 
reflects the company's true value. In contrast, the IPO excess initial return is caused by 
the deliberate underpricing behavior of issuers or underwriters. As a starting point here, 
scholars investigated and developed many explanations that tend to be known as the 
underpricing theory, which occupied the mainstream view of the IPO. Simultaneously, 
the development of Western IPO theory falls under the asymmetric information of the 
financial field. All of the above shows that the IPO underpricing is becoming a topic of 
focus in the world, and it had the support of many empirical conclusions in the 1980’s. 
A.  Asymmetry theory between investors 
(1) Winner’s Curse Hypothesis 
Capen, Clapp and Canpbel first proposed the Winner's Curse Hypothesis. They 
believe that the auction value of the objects is uncertain in any style of auction; 
the winners usually are the people who overvalued the auction objects, and the 
rate of return from the auction is usually lower than the abnormal return. From 
the Rock’s (1986) model, the issuing companies are uncertain about the true 
value of the IPO market, however they have to set the IPO offering price. If 
IPO’s are over subscription, it is necessary to execute quota supply. Rock 
believes that there is information asymmetry between the informed and 
uninformed investors. Uninformed investors have more opportunities to 
subscribe to the IPO compared to informed investors, and they will face the 
Winner’s Curse. Underwriters have to underprice the IPO in order to attract more 
uninformed investors. The more uncertain the market value of the listed 
companies, the more underpricing will be on the IPO.  
 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) expanded Rock’s model, and they put forward that there 
is a monotonic relationship between IPO underpricing and the uncertainty of firm 
value. They believe that the higher uncertainty of the company and the higher 
cost for investors to access information, the greater the Winner's Curse issue and 
the greater the degree of underpricing on the IPO. There are many empirical 
results that support this view, which becomes one of the most definite 
explanations on IPO underpricing theory. 
(2) Bandwagon Hypothesis 
The Bandwagon hypothesis refers to the idea that an investor will not subscribe if 
he finds that no one is willing to subscribe for the IPO, even if the investor has 
the advantage of information of the company; in contrast, an investor will be 
willing to subscribe for the IPO, even if he has a lack of IPO information if he 
sees others subscribing. In order to attract the first potential investors, the issuing 
company set the underpricing on IPO, which causes the bandwagon effect. 
B.  Asymmetry between issuers and underwriters 
Baron (1982) proposed an Agent-based explanation theory. The theory is that 
underwriters tend to have more information on the capital market and the offering price 
compared to the issuing company, which has a monopoly power on the pricing of IPO’s. 
Issuing companies and underwriters are both important characters in stock markets with 
different objectives. The goal of the issuing companies is obviously to maximize the 
issuing revenue；however the target of the underwriters is to maximize their 
commission fees. In order to reach the target, underwriters may do a tradeoff between 
maximizing the commission fees and reducing the issuing price. If a listed company is 
not a good superintendent to regulate the behavior of underwriters during the processing 
time on stock issuance, the underwriter may be tempted to lower the offering price in 
order to increase the probability of success on its underwriting activities. That is to say, 
the optimal choice for the issuer is underpricing the IPO.  
However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) put forward related evidence to the above 
theory. They found that underwriters issued at underpricing as well when they listed 
their own shares. It shows that it is not significant whether the company is supervising or 
not. Generally speaking, scholars believed that the results do not support Baron's 
hypothesis; however, this evidence does not fully refute Baron’s theory either. People 
may think that this underpricing is the basic necessary cost of listing stocks as an 
explanation.  
C.  Asymmetry between issuers and investors  
(1) Signaling hypothesis 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) advocated 
the IPO underpricing signal theory.  Actually it is an extension of “leaving a good taste” 
from Ibbostson (1975): the issuer may be underpricing to investors intentionally in order 
to leave a good taste. Scholars believe that the outside investors have difficulty 
distinguishing between good and bad corporations in the IPO markets; therefore, the 
underpricing IPO becomes an important way to transmit signals about the quality of 
listed companies for outside investors. This is a good method to solve the adverse 
selection problem that may arise by rational investors. At that time, investors have 
already got the good taste of the underpriced IPO, and the listed companies begin to 
make up for their losses from the underpriced IPO through the method of refinancing on 
high offering prices.  
 
Moreover, the signaling hypothesis states that the percentage of the shares of the original 
shareholders from the issuing company and the offering price of the IPO are a signal of 
the company’s intrinsic value, which reflects the mean and variance of future cash flows 
on the intrinsic value of the company as well. This theory shows the information 
asymmetry between the issuers and investors. Good issuers often send a high quality 
signal for investors by underpricing IPO, because the high quality issuers are able to 
launch a Secondary Equity Offering (SEO) in order to make up their losses from 
underpricing quickly. In contrast, the lower quality companies cannot mimic this signal 
behavior due to cost constraints, which means they cannot be compensated by issuing in 
the future to make up their losses. In addition, Welch (1989) also believes that the 
underpricing on the IPO is a good way to obtain a higher issuing price in the future. 
However, Michaely and Shaw (1994) show different options about underpricing on the 
IPO, which argue that there is not a huge difference between significantly underpricing 
an IPO and not underpricing an IPO on SEO in the future.  
（2）Dynamic information acquisition hypothesis 
Benveniste and Welhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991) used this model to analyze 
how to get the true information of listed companies by using underpricing on the IPO. 
The writers believed that the underpricing on the IPO could bring more attention to the 
inquiring investors, and lower the quoted price they wish to subscribe in their minds. 
Underwriters usually give investors more underpricing on the IPO in order to encourage 
more inquiring investors to subscribe in the markets. Moreover, Aggarwal, Prabhala and 
Puri (2002) mentioned that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of the 
IPO shareholding and the degree of underpricing. 
In addition, Chemmanur (1993) had analyzed the asymmetry between issuers and 
investors as well, and he clarified that the issuing companies have more information 
compared to the outside investors, such as the information on intrinsic value of the listed 
companies. That is to say, outside investors may spend more time to work on the listed 
company’s information, but well-performing issuers will compensate investors by 
underpricing the IPO.  
2.2.2 High Initial Rate of Return Explanation in IPOs in the Secondary Market 
(1) Price support explanation 
Price support means the behavior that underwriters consciously use in the stock trading 
market in order to prevent or slow down the reduction on the stock price at the 
beginning, which keeps the offering price at a certain level. In principle, the price 
support of underwriters falls under the behavior of stock manipulation. However, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States believes that this is a 
disadvantage element on the equity diversification if an IPO has a sharp decline on the 
first day of listing; it is important to allow the behavior of keeping IPO price stability on 
the initial day. At the same time, the SEC requires for the strict disclosure system, which 
means the underwriters must disclose in the prospectus if they intend to use price 
support.  When this behavior begins, the underwriter needs to notify the SEC as well. 
Moreover, the SEC requires that the floor price could not exceed the offering price; 
otherwise it is going to be considered a violation of the regulations.  
Ruud (1993) first proposed that underwriter price support might cause a high initial rate 
of return on the IPO. Ruud tested the existence of price support by checking whether the 
rate of return on the IOP is normal distribution or skewed distribution in four weeks after 
listing. Moreover, Schultz and Zaman (1994) showed us some reasons about the 
underwriter price support, and one of the main reasons was to successfully maintain the 
IPO issuing. Furthermore, Chowdhry, Nanda (1996), Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm 
(1996) believed that the underwriter price support theory and underpricing theory are 
actually two alternative methods to overcome the uncertainty of information of an IPO. 
 
(2) Speculator bubble explanation 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Shiller (1990) first proposed that the excess initial rates 
of return in the short term might be caused by the investors’ overenthusiasm and an 
investing bubble in the stock market. They believed that the characteristics and the 
process of IPO distribution could easily lead investors to set high offering pricing in 
their minds on the early trading stage of an IPO. Camerer (1989) also pointed out that 
the valuation of listed companies is difficult to evaluate, and there is high uncertainty on 
the company’s stock; investors’ enthusiasm on the stock market leads to the existence of 
investing bubbles. 
 
In fact, this theory actually implies a hypothetical: if the high initial rate of return on the 
IPO is caused by the over-enthusiasm of investors, then it brings the negative rate of 
return after the cooling of market sentiment. Therefore people think that if the initial rate 
of return on the IPO is low for a long period of time, it is caused by the high trading 
price on the first day instead of the low offering price on that day.   
2.2.3 Economy Behavior 
(1) Short sales constraints 
Miller (1997) mentions the short sales constraints theory, and he believes that only those 
who are optimistic about the future of companies will purchase the new shares. An IPO 
offering price usually goes up in the first trading day because of the restriction of short 
selling on IPOs. 
(2) Market sentiment hypothesis 
When the market is going down, issuers often adapt to the new market by changing 
timing and volume of IPOs, as well as the degree of underpricing. Most issuers will go 
public during a “hot” issue, a time when their stock is very popular. Lucas and Mcdonald 
(1990) build a model to explain that the issuer of a company may delay the listing shares 
when the market underestimates its true value. Moreover, Ritter (1984) refers to the fact 
that the higher the price risk, the higher the degree of underpricing that will be allowed 
by the issuers and underwriters in order to attract the emerging investors. Conroy and 
Aggarwal （2000） prove the negative correlation between market sentiment and the 
degree of underpricing. 
2.2.4 Empirical Research about Underpricing in China 
Base on the literature review in Table 2.3, it is found that the sample period used is often 
limited to a certain period of time, which is mostly before 2005. Moreover many studies 
do not take all relevant factors into consideration to explain IPO underpricing in China. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of systematic research on the comparison of different 
determinants for Chinese underpricing in various periods. 









Zinan Bi (2007) 1996-2006 1072 107 Negative correlation 
between underpricing 
and offer price. 
Shi yuan Zhang 
(2007) 
1995-2007 1031 119 Positive correlation 
between underpricing 
and PE ratio 




Wenyan Xu and 
Kangping Wu 
2000-2001 NA NA Market maker is a reason 
for underpricing 
(2007) 
Chi and Padgett 
(2005) 
1996-2000 668 129 Strictly controlled issue 
data and inequality of 
supple are reason for 
underpricing 
Mok and Hui 
(1998) 
1990-1993 87 289 Underpricing related to 
state ownership  
Ting and Tse 
(2006) 
1995-1998 343 124 Winner curse theory is 
reason for underpricing 









Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Sources and Description 
The data contains all listed companies with both A-shares and B- shares that went public 
from 1991 to the end of 2010, which covers 42 companies in total in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). Most companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) are 
difficult to find data source of variables in my model, such as information on turnover 
rates of first trading date, so I only cover the listed companies with fully disclosed 
information for samples. The main data used are collected and calculated from China 
Center Economic Research (CCER) and Chinese Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR). These databases mainly contain information about IPOs. 
Meanwhile, some information, including industry type and age of the company before 
issuing, is collected manually from the public documents from SZSE and prospectus.  
 
There are two steps in total for processing the data I collect. The first step is to use Excel 
program to summarize all the data, and calculate the mean and standard deviation. The 
second step is to use programing Stata to run the regression model. 
 
The Chinese stock market started in 1991, and it quickly developed in the period of 1991 
to the end of 2010. A-shares stock is more popular to trade than B-shares in China. There 
were 2861 IPOs of A-shares from 1991 to 2010, but only 108 IPOs of B-shares. From 
the statistics we can see that the huge difference on the number of issuing between A-
shares and B-shares in the Chinese stock exchange market. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The degree of underpricing （DUP） is measured as first-day return (RETit): DUP = 
RETit=( Pi1 - Pi0 )/ Pi0, where Pi1 is the closing price of stock i on the first trading day, and 
Pi0 is the offering price of stock i.  The higher the initial return is, the higher the degree 
of underpricing is. If DUP is positive, we can say that the issue is underpriced. If DUP is 
negative, we say that the issue is overpriced. If DUP is equal to zero, then the issue is 
fairly priced.  
 
The multi regression model I use for testing the variables that explain underpricing is 
defined as follows: 
 
In the equation above, D is a dummy variable, X1~X4 and variable D are independent 
variables, DUP or RETit is the dependent variable,  is a constant term, ~ are 
partial regression coefficients,  is error term which is assuming ~(0, ). 
Where, 
X1= Ln (Issue size) =Ln (Issue price * Total issue shares), 
DUP = RETit =α 0 + β1 *X1 + β2 *X2 + β3 *X3 + β4 *X4 + β5 *D + ε
α 0 β1 β5
ε ε σ 2
X2= Offering price, 
X3= Turnover rate of first starting date, 
X4= Age of company before issuing, 
D= Type of industry, it is the dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the IPO is 
in manufactory industry, 0 for others. 
 
3.3 Relationship Between DUP and Independent Variables 
X1:  Ln (Issue size) 
The logarithm of the total funds that IPO raise, which equals total shares issued multiply 
by offer price. Some scholars from China predicted that the degree of underpricing 
would increase when the issue size decreases， which is negative relationship between 
them. That is because the small offerings always associate with high uncertainty. Carter 
and Manaster (1990) showed some investors use issue size to evaluate the performance 
of IPO firms. 
 
X2:  IPO offering price 
Offering Price is the initial price of IPO. In general speaking, the stocks with high 
offering price have limited space to move up; while, the stocks with low price have more 
opportunity to jump up to the higher price level. According to Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), the low offering price is the signal to reveal the company’s average rates of 
return and variance; therefore, the issuing company can transmit the intrinsic value to 
the markets through the underpricing level of IPO and the percentage of inside 
shareholders. From the Chinese stock market, we can see that most of the investors is 
individually instead of institutional investors. The individual investors are small and 
their investment behaviors are more flexible, and some of institutional investors use the 
advantage of their funds to make the malicious speculation, which causes the strong 
atmosphere of speculation on Chinese security market. The speculative phenomenon is 
popular in China, and the stocks with low offering price are much easier for individual 
investors to speculate, which causes the higher level on underpricing of IPOs. In other 
words, the offering price may exert an influence on underpricing level of IPO, and there 
is a negative relationship between offering price and the degree of IPO underpricing.  
 
X3： Turnover rate of first starting date 
Turnover rate in the first starting date is equal to the number of shares traded in the first 
trading day divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Generally speaking, the 
turnover rate measures the potential development and the market value of the listed 
company and represents the expectation of the listed company from investors; therefore, 
the turnover rate determines the offering price of IPO in some way. Moreover, base on 
the fixed enterprise value, the higher the turnover rate of the listed company, the more 
expectation are given by investors, which means the investors have lower risk to invest 
in this company and the offering price is going to be high; therefore, the degree of IPO 
underpricing will be low. That is to say, there is a negative relationship between 
turnover rate and degree of IPO underpricing. 
 
X4： Age of company before issuing 
Age of the firms before issuing shares means the number of years in existence before 
going public. The time interval between the issuing date and the listing date of the 
company is an important variable to measure the asymmetric information on 
underwriters and investors. Ritter (1984) has written a research paper that the longer the 
firm establishes the less risk of issuing the new stocks, which means the low 
underpricing level on IPO. In other words, there is a negative relationship between the 
age of firms before issuing and the degree of IPO underpricing. 
 
D： Dummy variable for the type of industry 
Type of firms is dummy variables that the value equals to 1 if the listed company is in 
manufactory industry, and it equals to 0 for others. Some scholars found that the degree 
of IPO underpricing in the manufacture company is usually more than in other 
companies in China.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic of Variables 
The sample data I collected are 84 IPOs from both A-shares and B-shares in Chinese 
stock market from 1991 to 2000. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 describe the statistic analysis 
of independent variable on A-shares and B-shares, which report the detail information 
on the sample size, sample mean and standard deviation, and the minimum and 
maximum value of the sample data.  





  Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of independent variable on B-shares 
 
From the table we can see that the mean value of A-shares samples is 2.41, and the 
standard deviation is 3.54; while the mean value of B-shares samples is only 0.14, and 
the standard deviation is 0.53. That is to say, A-shares have more degree of underpricing 
IPOs than B-shares. Furthermore, if we compare with the maximum value between A-
share and B-share, we can get the largest value of A-share is 17.05; in contract, the 
largest value of B-share is only 1.51, which means the IPO underpricing issue can be 
shown more significantly on Chinese A-shares stock market. X4 refers to the age of 
company before issuing and D refers to the type of company， and both A-shares and 
B-shares have similar average on the variable of X4 and D. 
From Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, we can see the statistic analysis of dependent variables on 
A-shares and B-shares. X1 refers to the ln of issue size, which keeps stabilize from 7 to 8 
for both A-shares and B-shares.  X2 refers to the offering price. The A-share stocks have 
higher offering price compare to B-shares. As we can see from the tables below, the 
mean value of offering price for A-shares is 6.07；while the mean value for B-shares is 
only 3.58. X3 refers to the turnover rate. The average of turnover rate of A-shares is 
much higher than B-shares, which indicates that investors are preferred to invest more in 
A-shares in the stock market.  
    Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables on A-shares 
Variable Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum Median 
X1 42 7.452381 .5037605 7 8 7 
X2 42 6.070952 4.843343 1 20.8 4.365 
X3 42 12.9031 14.62857 0.01 64.57 10.32 
X4 42 7.738095 13.40924 0 81 4.5 
D 42 .5238095 .5054867 0 1 1 
 
     Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables on B-shares 
Variable Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum Median 
X1 42 7.690476 .5174089 7 9 8 
X2 42 3.584286 1.734608 1.19 10.53 3.365 
X3 42 2.398095 3.342751 0 12.46 0.92 
X4 42 7.761905 13.63426 0 83 4 
D 42 .5238095 .5054867 0 1 1 
 
4.2 The Result of the Regression 
I use the Stata program to run the ordinary least square regression model of IPO 
underpricing. I am going to use 5% as the significant level for this regression model. The 
formula of the regression model I mentioned before from my paper is as follows: 
 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show the result of this regression model for both A-shares and 
B-shares.  






DUP = RETit =α 0 + β1 *X1 + β2 *X2 + β3 *X3 + β4 *X4 + β5 *D + ε
         Table 4.5: the regression result of model on A-shares 
 




4.2.1 Issuing Size 
The issuing size is the offer price multiplies by the number of shares issued. From the 
previous analysis we found that there is a negative relationship between degrees of 
underpricing (DUP) and issuing size. Base on the statistic analysis from both A-shares 
and B-shares, we can see that the coefficient for A-shares between DUP and issuing size 
is negative 2.23, and for B-shares is negative 0.67. The negative means that the bigger of 
the issuing size, the lower the average initial return. Moreover, as the increase of the 
issuing size, the standard deviation of initial return becomes smaller，which is better 
prove that the negative relationship between DUP and issuing size. In addition, if we 
look at the value of Prob. (t) for A-shares, Prob. (t) equal to 0.039, which is less than 
0.05. Therefore, the issuing size of A-shares has statistically significant effect on the 
underpricing of IPO in Chinese stock market. However, the Prob. (t) for B-shares is 
equal to 0.7, which is more than 0.05. It indicates that the issuing size of B-shares may 
not impact on the underpricing of IPO.  
4.2.2 Offering Price 
The second parameter β2 is referring to the offering price. From the table 4.5 we can see 
that the slope coefficient for IPO offering price is -1.71 for A-shares, and it further prove 
the negative relationship between offering price and underpricing IPO. In addition, the 
sample data I collect from Chinese stock market show that almost 70% of new shares 
have low offering price. This fact means that most of the new shares’ prices have large 
room to go up in the secondary market.  
The regression model shows that the t ratio of A-shares for offer price is -1.51, and the 
value of Prob. (t) is equal to 0.14. The vale is much higher than 0.05, which means this 
result is not statistically significant on underpricing of IPO. Compare to B-shares, the 
value of Prob. (t) is equal to 0.27. The result is not statistically significant as well. B-
shares are not popular to paly as A-shares in Chinese stock market, and the offering 
price is much higher than A-shares. Therefore, the IPO underpricing is not obviously 
showing in the B-shares market.  
4.2.3 Age of the Firm Before Going Public 
There is a relationship between the age of the firm before going public and underpricing 
IPO. From the regression analysis result of A-shares, the value of Prob. (t) is equal to 
0.63. The Prob. (t) value is more than 0.05, which means the result is not significant and 
the age of firm before going public has little effect on the underpricing of IPO. If we 
look at the coefficient, it is only -0.0177, which is better show us the age of the firm 
before going public and the underpricing of IPO do not have significant linear 
relationship.  
 
Compare to B-shares, let us look the regression result again. The Prob. (t) value for B-
shares is 0.96, and the value is more than 0.05 as well, which is not significant. The 
coefficient is 0.0003, even more smaller compare with A-shares. Both results from A-
shares and B-shares show that there is little linear relationship between the age of firm 
before going public term and the underpricing of IPO. It demonstrates that the age of 
firm before going public term is not the reason for the underpricing of IOP. 
4.2.4 Turnover Rate 
In the empirical analysis of the IPO underpricing, I try to find the underpricing reasons 
only from the primary market, and do not consider of the risk and the information 
asymmetry effects. The underpricing of IPO may not all from the primary market, it may 
from the over speculation of the secondary market. The turnover rate is an important 
index to measure the over speculation issue in the secondary market. From the 
regression analysis, we can see the Prob. (t) is equal to 0.021; it is less than 0.05, which 
is significant result. The turnover rate is one of the most important variables to affect 
underpricing of IPO. If we look at for B-shares, the Prob. (t) is equal to 0.65; more than 
0.05, which means turnover rate is not significant to affect underpricing IPO for B-
shares.  
4.2.5 Industry Type  
Some research paper indicate that manufactory industry has dominated position in 
Chinese market, and the degree of IPO underpricing in the manufacture company is 
usually more than in other companies in China. However, as we can see from the table, 
Prob. (t) value equal to 0.313 for A-shares, and 0.288 for B-shares. Both of them are 
statistically insignificant variable. Perhaps, the reason why it is not main factor to 
influence underpricing is investors can know equal information about IPO companies in 
Chinese stock market.  
4.2.6 Error Term 
In our model, the error term may consists of other influenced variables such as return on 
equity, earning per share, operation margin, reputation for stock and so on. The Prob. (t) 
value for A-shares is 0.007, which is a statistically significant variable. Perhaps some 
other factors like speculation behavior, reputation, and imperfect information disclosure 
are important factors for underpricing IPO.  
                                            











Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Conclusion of the Study 
IPO underpricing is a universal phenomenon that exists widely in every country’s stock 
market. Compared with evidence from other countries, the magnitude of underpricing in 
China is even more serious.  
 
In the research, the study examined the initial underpricing level for a sample of 42 IPOs 
on both of A-shares and B-shares in Chinese stock market from 1991 to 2010. I have 
examined the relationship between the degree of underpricing and five independent 
variables hypothesized to impact underpricing issue.  
 
Results have shown that turnover rate and error term affect the initial return significantly 
for A-shares, and none of terms from B-shares are significantly variables for resulting 
underpricing IPO. We find that ex ante uncertainty alone could not well explain Chinese 
IPO underpricing, which is due to the imperfect information disclosure and lack of 
market discipline in Chinese emerging market. Underwriter reputation and management 
credibility could partially explain Chinese underpricing. And market sentiment as well 
as speculation behavior is feasible to explain underpricing IPO in Chinese stock market 
to some extent.  
 
The result of this regression model show that the R square is equals to 0.38 for A-shares 
and only 0.1 for B-shares. R square means a statistic to test the goodness of fit of the 
model, which indicates that the model needs to be improved due to relatively lower 
number of R square. The chosen factors cannot explain the degree of underpricing 
sufficiently. There is 38% of the variation in dependent variable can be explained by 
explanatory variable for A-shares. And there is only 10% of the variation in dependent 
variable can be explained by explanatory variable for B-shares. In conclusion, turnover 




Since the R square is low, especially for the B-shares, the model is not good for 
examining the factors influence underpricing. It implies that there are more variables 
should be include in the model for the further study, like speculation behavior, 
underwriter reputation, ROE, ROA, EPS and so on.  
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